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Abstract 
The relationship between populism and ethno-territorial politics has emerged repeatedly in 
empirical studies outside Western Europe. This article presents the main aim of the special 
issue, which is the systematic and empirically based investigation of the linkages between 
populism and ethno-territorial ideologies in Western European states. By introducing a 
conceptual map, in which the defining characteristics of populism, regionalism, state-
nationalism, and Euroscepticism are identified and conceptualized, the article proceeds with 
the possible linkage points between both concepts. It also proposes a smallest common 
denominator relationship between populism and ethno-territorial ideologies in that the notion 
of ‘homogeneous people’ becomes inexorably connected to the concept of ‘nation’ or ‘region’ 
pitted against political, economic, and cultural elites operating at various levels of government. 
By foreshadowing and discussing several of the key findings of the empirical case studies 
presented in this special issue, the introductory article highlights important emerging trends. 
Most crucially, only radical-right parties (both regionalist and state-nationalist) appear to be 
inherently and stably populist. The same parties are also clearly Eurosceptic. By contrast, 
several regionalist parties, positioned in the mainstream left or right, tend to adopt a populist 
discourse only incidentally and temporarily.      
 
Keywords: Populism, Regionalism, Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Centre/Periphery, Ethnic 
politics, Multilevel Politics 
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Introduction  
 
The scholarship on populism outside Western Europe has often identified center-periphery 
dynamics and ethno/racial diversity as strictly linked to populist mobilizations. Centre-
periphery dynamics have featured prominently both in Northern and Latin America. In the US, 
until very recently, populism has been primarily identified as the expression of malcontent of 
the (communitarian) deep Mid-West and/or South against the (liberal) ‘Coastal elites’ (Pollak, 
1962; Nugent, 1963; Palmer, 1980; Carter, 1996; Savage, 2012). In Canada, populist 
movements of different ideological orientations have primarily emerged in the Western 
peripheries in contraposition to the elites of ‘Central Canada’ (Conway, 1979; Laycock, 1990; 
Nevitt, 1998). For long time, populism in Latin America was primarily conceived as a 
macroeconomic strategy—i.e., Import Substitution Industrialization (Dornbush and Edwards, 
1991)—aimed to cope with the peripheral position of that world region vis-à-vis the centers of 
the world economy (i.e. US and Western Europe). In addition, in more recent studies, a clear 
centre-periphery dynamic has been identified within and across individual states; for instance 
in the relationship between the Andean mountain areas and the plains (Dunkerley, 2007). 
Similarly, ethnic and racial diversity has featured prominently in the study of populism in the 
US, in Latin America, in India and in Central-Eastern Europe (Carter, 1995; Lowndes, 2008; 
Madrid, 2008; Webber, 2011; Pantnaik and Chalam, 1996; Bugaric, 2008).        
However, since the scholarship of party politics in Western Europe has been deeply shaped by 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Jeffery and Wincott, 2010), the literature on populist parties has 
taken the nation-state as the natural context of analysis, systematically downplaying sub-state 
ethno-territorial instances. Centre-periphery dynamics have been given scant attention and 
have popped up in the literature only incidentally: when the main interpreters of populism in a 
given country, such as the Vlaams Belang in Belgium and the Northern League in Italy, where 
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also regionalist (or minority nationalist) parties (Pauwels, 2011; McDonnell, 2006; Biorcio, 
2017). As for ethnic diversity, this has been pointed out as strongly related to (right-wing) 
populism but almost exclusively in regard to xenophobic and/or racist claims against 
immigrants (Van der Brug et al., 2000; Rydgren, 2003; 2005; 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 
2008). In contrast, the link between populism and ethnic divisions within the ‘native’ 
populations has remained largely unexplored in the Western European context.  
Finally, while the scholarship has widely investigated the relationship between populism and 
Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; Krouwel, 2007; Ruzza, 2009; Harmsen, 2010; Tournier-Sol, 
2015), the study of such relationship has only focused on two levels—national and EU—with 
extremely rare works analyzing the multi-level (i.e. regional-national-EU) dynamics of the 
populism/Euroscepticism nexus (Mazzoleni, 2005).      
This special issue aims to directly address these lacunae within the scholarship, by investigating 
center-periphery relationships, ethnic cleavages and multi-level dynamics that impact upon or 
are informed by populist politics in Western Europe. This article opens the special issue, 
providing a conceptual map and an explorative comparative analysis of the relationship and 
linkages between populism, regionalism (or minority nationalism), majority ethno-nationalism 
and Euroscepticism.  
In the next section, we introduce, discuss, and define the concept of populism.  This is followed 
by a segment devoted to conceptualizing and defining specific ethno-territorial ideologies— 
regionalism, majority nationalism, and Euroscepticism—and highlighting the potential 
linkages between each of them and populism. We, then, present several ideological 
combinations that are reflected in the cases analyzed in the articles of this special issue. We 
further discuss these combinations in the final section of this introductory article.  
 
Populism: Between thin ideology and discourse  
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Many studies on populism tend to stress the difficulty of the scholarship to agree on a clear 
definition of the underlying concept (Berlin, Hofstadter and MacRae, 1968; Canovan, 1981; 
Taguieff, 1995; Taggart, 2000). Leaving aside the loose use of the term made by the media 
(Bale at al., 2011), two main factors can be held responsible for conceptual slipperiness or 
disagreement in the academic debate. First, the predominance of single case-studies or region 
specific studies—e.g., Latin American (Di Tella, 1965; De la Torre, 2010), Northern American 
(Kazin, 1998; Berlet and Lyons, 2000), Western Europe (Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1995; Rooduijn 
et al., 2014; Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016; Akkerman, T. et al., 2017), Central-Eastern Europe 
(Mudde, 2000; Minkenberg, 2002; Vujacic, 2003; Pirro, 2014), etc.— often ignoring 
contributions coming from other regional-comparative studies (De la Torre, 2018). Second, a 
certain tendency to shift the discussion from the essence of the concept of populism to the 
conceptual category to which populism belongs: whether populism is an ideology (Mudde, 
2004; Stanley, 2008), a discourse (Laclau, 1977; 2005; Rooduijn and Powels, 2011), a frame 
(Aslanidis, 2016; Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2017) or a strategy (Wayland, 2001; Jansen, 2011). 
However, digging beneath the surface, it is possible to identify a certain substantive 
convergence in how populism is conceived in the recent international scholarship (Panizza, 
2005; De la Torre, 2015; Müller, 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Indeed, the distinction 
between strategy, discourse and frame is more superficial than substantive, given that 
proponents of ‘populism as a strategy’ include also ‘populist rhetoric’ (i.e. ‘discourse’) as a 
defining element of that strategy (Jansen, 2011: 83). As for the distinction between ideology 
and discourse, this is typically reduced by the very advocates of ‘populism as an ideology’ to 
that of a ‘thin ideology’ (Stanley, 2008). The distance between the two positions can be called 
into question even further by the fact that Michael Freeden himself (the ‘father’ of the ‘thin 
ideology’1 concept) has expressed doubt about populism even qualifying as an ideology at all, 
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even a thin one (Freeden, 2017). Instead, he appears to argue in favor of populism’s border-
line nature in-between (thin) ideology and discourse (Freeden, 2017: 10).  
If Freeden’s contribution helps us reach an acceptable middle ground in the debate on the 
conceptual category containing the phenomenon of populism, a certain ‘center of gravity’ has 
emerged based on the definition proposed amongst others by Cas Mudde and consisting of the 
following components: a) a vision of society as divided in two groups, the ‘pure people’ and 
the ‘corrupt elites’; b) the internal homogeneity of the two groups; c) the antagonistic 
relationship between the two groups; and d) always siding with the ‘pure people’ as the only 
legitimate source of the ‘general will’ (Mudde, 2004: 543). These defining criteria, advanced 
by a key proponent of ‘populism as an ideology’ are to some extent compatible with most 
definitions proposed by advocates of ‘populism as a discourse’ such as Laclau (2005) and 
Rooduijn and Powels (2011) as well as the advocates of ‘populism as a strategy’ such as Jansen 
(2011). 
Other important elements emphasized by several authors, such as a sense of crisis (Taggart, 
2000; Rooduijn, 2014), can actually be considered contextual conditions under which a 
populist discourse may be more viable or successful (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). By contrast, 
other recurring elements such as the stigmatization of ‘dangerous others’ (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2008) may be better understood as ‘linkage nodes’ to other (thick or thin) 
ideologies, such as in the connection between populism and the radical right (Betz, 1994; 
Rydgren, 2005). Indeed, populism can be linked with very different ideological orientations 
from radical left to radical right; from inclusionary to exclusionary; from socialist to neoliberal; 
from secular to religious; from fanaticism for charismatic leadership to fanaticism for grass-
roots democracy (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; March, 2017).  
The fact that populism can connect with completely different (and even contrasting) ideological 
orientations is also due to its intrinsic ambivalence (Taggart, 2000; Heinisch and Mazzoleni 
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2017). Populist claims are, by definition, ambivalent because the key concepts of populism are 
not sufficiently defined: ‘the people’ are depicted as a homogeneous and amorphous group 
generally without differences of interest and class. In fact, the way populists conceive of the 
group making up the ‘elites’ may be even more vague and entirely situational. Therefore, 
ambivalence may be considered as a key characteristic of populism, providing strategic 
flexibility and adaptability as well as a major source of diffusion of populist discourse among 
political actors. This means that, while there are parties for which populism represents their 
core ideology/discourse, it is much more likely to find parties that engage in a populist 
discourse informed by a different (more or less well defined) ideological position, or parties 
that forge a synthesis between populism and another ideology.   
Since, this special issue is concerned with the linkages between populism and the ethno-
territorial (thin) ideologies, particular attention is devoted to recognizing which 
ideological/discursive elements in the empirical cases are distinctively populist, which ones 
come from ethno-territorial ideologies and what the linkage nodes are. This will allow 
distinguishing, for instance, between primarily populist parties engaging with regionalist 
claims and primarily regionalist parties using a populist discourse. It will also allow for the 
exploration of how the populist actors cope with the challenges arising from the ambivalence 
rooted in their often contradictory ideological patchwork, e.g. populism and regionalism and 
state-nationalism. We now turn to introducing the key ideological elements of regionalism, 
majority (or state) nationalism, and Euroscepticism, thus completing the conceptual map that 
we set out to provide.      
 
 
Ethno-territorial ideologies and their potential links with populism  
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Regionalism  
Regionalism can be defined as a thin ideology that politicizes the specificities of the population 
living in a certain sub-state region vis-à-vis the population of the state as a whole (Fitjar, 2010). 
These specificities, which can be socio-cultural (language, religion, prevailing ideological 
orientations, etc.) and/or socio-economic (type and level of economic development, prevalent 
economic sectors, economic status of the region vis-à-vis the rest of state, etc.), are seen as the 
bases of a separate ethno-territorial identity which should be formally recognized and 
accommodated by the state. Indeed, regionalist parties are defined as those self-contained 
political organizations that focus on the protection/enhancement of regional identities and 
interests, challenging the central state with their requests for some kind of territorial self-
government (De Winter, 1998; Massetti, 2009; Alonso, 2012; Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2017).  
The level of self-government claimed by regionalist parties can vary considerably. In this 
respect, Massetti and Schakel (2016) have identified a crucial distinction between those 
regionalist parties that pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state (‘secessionist’) and 
those that do not (‘autonomist’), highlighting how regionalist parties can change their claims 
over time. In addition, Dandoy (2010) has highlighted much more stable differences within the 
‘secessionist’ category, distinguishing between ‘independentist’, ‘irredentist’, and ‘rattachist’ 
parties.  
Adopting a different terminology, some scholars prefer to distinguish between ‘regionalist’ and 
‘stateless nationalist’ (or ‘minority nationalist’) parties (Hepburn, 2009; Elias, 2009). However, 
the distinction seems to defy a persuasive definition and, in the end, the little value added by 
this distinction is attested by the fact that the very proponents consider both regionalist and 
stateless nationalist parties as belonging to one same party family (Hepburn, 2009). We, 
therefore, treat stateless (or minority) nationalism as an internal sub-category of regionalism— 
denotating those cases in which a claim to nationhood is made—bearing in mind that it does 
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not necessarily coincide with the sub-category of secessionism. Like populism, regionalism 
can (and does) also combine itself with all sorts of ideological orientations, from the radical-
left to the radical-right (Massetti, 2009; Massetti and Shakel, 2015). The linkages with 
populism can happen therefore within a broader ideological outlook.  
The most basic and most evident connection between regionalism and populism resides in the 
potential correspondence between the two foundational dichotomies: ‘people vs. elites’ can be 
equated to ‘region (or minority nation) vs. state’ and vice versa. In the regionalist-populist 
synthesis, the ‘good people’ are the people in the region, while the elites are the politicians 
defending state interests at the expenses of the regional population. Regionalist populists 
typically focus on the putative incapacity or unwillingness of national elites in the far away 
capital to recognize, understand, and even consider the specific needs of the region.  As 
highlighted by Taggart (2000), populist discourse often refers to a lost ‘heartland’. Indeed, the 
politics of resentment and victimization, so typical of populism, might resonate well with 
ethno-regional minorities that perceive a lack of recognition or fair treatment of their region by 
the state elites. Given the structural antagonism between regionalist parties and the (statewide 
parties’) politicians that run the state, we can expect to find this minimal level of populist 
discourse in virtually all regionalist parties. Similarly, we can expect a regional populist party, 
or a particularly autonomous regional branch of a statewide populist party, to back-up their 
criticism of elites with a regionalist discourse. It is worth pointing out that both regionalist and 
populist parties can antagonize not only the state political elites but, where a regional 
government is in place, also the regional political elites. Whether the regionalist populist 
synthesis will target only the state elites or both the regional and state elites, will depend 
primarily on the role of the party in the regional and national party system (fringe party, 
relevant but not in office, relevant and in office, hegemonic and continuously in office) and by 
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the age/history of the party (new/old; history of co-operation/competition with statewide 
parties). 
Besides this basic connection, populism and regionalism can combine within the frame of a 
broader ideological orientation. In these cases, the political actors forging the regionalist 
populist synthesis may target not only (or not primarily) political elites but also economic 
and/or intellectual elites. In addition, regionalist populists can target not only regional and state 
elites but also supra-national and international ones (Mazzoleni, 2005). In Laclau’s terms 
(2005), they can challenge what they perceive as the dominant elite discourse from different 
ideological standpoints—e.g., challenging a dominant liberal/tolerant/pluralist discourse from 
a radical-right standpoint, or a dominant neoliberal/economic conservative discourse from a 
radical left standpoint, etc.).              
Special mention should be made of a particular category of regionalist parties—unionist 
regionalist parties—that operate in ethnically divided regions and often find themselves 
fighting on two fronts. These parties are as much assertive advocates of a distinct regional 
identity and regional self-government as they are staunch supporters of state territorial integrity 
against other ethno-regionalist (potentially or openly secessionist) movements/parties that have 
claims on the same region (Massetti, 2009: 504). In a way, like all regionalist parties, they are 
in a bargaining (and sometimes confrontational) relationship with the state for attaining a 
certain degree of self-government. At the same time, they fully side with the state against 
secessionist threats involving their region and mobilize people based on alternative ethno-
regional identities. It should be noted that highly autonomous regional branches of a statewide 
parties can also engage in this type of two-front battles. Indeed, some of these parties can enter 
into close agreements with (majority nationalist) statewide parties, thus becoming de-facto 
their regional branches – e.g., the agreements between the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the 
British Conservative Party in Northern Ireland and between Union of Navarrese People (UPN) 
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and the Spanish People’s Party in Navarra. If in such cases, parties make use of a populist 
discourse, then the ambivalence, as to who ‘the people’ really are, can become even blurrier. 
When they act as regionalist parties, ‘the people’ are likely to be (a particular ethnic group or) 
the regional population. If they act as regional agents of majority (state) nationalism, ‘the 
people’ will probably coincide with the majority (state) nation.   
 
State (or Majority) Nationalism 
Nationalism is widely considered as a thin ideology which prioritizes national divisions over 
other political issues and promotes the own nation vis-à-vis other nations (Freeden, 1998). State 
nationalism is the ideology at the basis of the (putative) nation-state: the nation is presented as 
the social pre-requisite and justification for the state; while the latter is seen as the 
political/institutional instrument of the former. If the nation-state project is not internally 
contested, state nationalism remains an implicit or dormant ideology. If the nation-state project 
is internally contested, different scenarios open up, depending primarily on the level of 
democracy of the political system and on the mobilization strategies of ethno-regionalist forces. 
Advanced liberal democracies tend of acknowledge the legitimate presence of ethno-regional 
identities that are uneasy with a strict pursuit/upholding of the nation-state project. Within the 
resulting democratic dialectic, some political forces can voice their resistance against this 
pluralist revision of the nation-state project. Therefore, in these cases, state nationalism remains 
a particularly potent force in the form of majority nationalism.2 The main concern of majority 
nationalists is the mobilization  of ethno-territorial identities by regionalist parties/movements. 
In particular, majority nationalists tend to target ethno-territorial minorities that are perceived 
as a threat to national integrity, either because of their own strength or because there are 
protected/supported by a neighboring (kin) state. In theory, majority nationalist parties can 
have different ideological orientations along the left-right continuum. However, in the context 
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of liberal democracies, parties situated on the right of the political spectrum—particularly 
conservative and radical-right parties—tend to engage more with majority nationalism. 
Therefore, the populist-nationalist synthesis tends to manifest itself as a form of right-wing 
populism (Loch, 2017).  
The most obvious linkage between majority nationalism and populism may be found in the 
identification of the (majority) nation as ‘the good people’, intended as a homogeneous group 
that does not allow internal (ethno-territorial) differentiation (Muller, 2016): either a 
person/group is in or is out of the ‘nation-people’. So, while the main ‘enemies’ of majority 
nationalist are the regionalist (particularly secessionist) political forces, in their populist-
nationalist synthesis the targeted elites are the national parties and cultural elites that are 
perceived to be softer vis-a-vis regionalist claims. Accusations made against these elites (which 
might include also international or supra-national elements) may range from being 
insufficiently assertive/resolute in protecting the unity and integrity of the nation-state to a full 
betrayal of the nation-state. It goes without saying that, beyond fighting against mobilized 
ethno-regional identities, majority nationalist parties also want to protect the national identity 
from the supposed threats posed by immigrant communities. In this case, their majority 
nationalism and exclusivist/xenophobic nativism results in the adoption of a radical-right 
ideology (Mudde, 2007). The populist radical-right synthesis thus presents the ‘good people’, 
understood as the majority/native nation (to the exclusion of ethno-territorial minorities and 
immigrant communities), against the ‘corrupt elites’, understood as those (pluralist and multi-
culturalist) political forces that do not protect (or work against) the homogeneity/purity of the 
nation.3     
 
Euroscepticism  
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State nationalism is not only concerned with internal threats to the integrity of the nation-state. 
It can also aim outward and upward by identifying international and/or supra-national actors 
that are accused of conspiring against the interests of the nation-state and depriving the nation-
people of their sovereignty. In this case, the linkage with populism is rather immediate because 
the influence of external elites (usually helped by internal elites) is seen as diminishing the 
people’s sovereignty. While general ‘sovereignism’ tends to target the main actors of 
globalization—such as transnational economic elites and international institutions (e.g., the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)— in Europe sovereigntist political forces 
tend to direct their recriminations against European integration and its creature, the European 
Union (EU). Euroscepticism can be seen, therefore, as a particular case of sovereignism and, 
in turn, a particular expression of state nationalism.  
Scholarship has identified different degrees and forms of Euroscepticism. The Sussex school 
distinguishes between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, whereby the former is defined as a 
qualified criticism of some EU policies (or integration in some policy areas) and the latter as 
an outright claim against EU membership (Taggart, 1998; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). In 
contrast, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) distinguish between political forces that oppose the very 
idea of European integration (Eurorejects) and those that, albeit supporting the principle of 
European integration, openly criticize the way in which it has been actualized (Eurosceptic).  
Like the other ethno-territorial ideologies, Euroscepticism can, in theory, combine itself with 
all types of leftist and rightist ideologies. In fact, empirical studies have found that 
Euroscepticism tends to connect itself primarily with radical-left and radical-right ideologies 
(Hix, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002). In particular, hard and/or principled Euroscepticism tends to 
be found primarily among radical-right parties (Vasilopoulou, 2011; 2018) whereas radical-
left parties tend to manifest primarily forms of criticism for the way the EU has been shaped 
(e.g. its allegedly neo-liberal ethos). 
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Regionalist parties also pay a lot of attention to European integration, as the latter considerably 
affects the opportunity structure of the former (Jeffery, 2000; Keating, 2004). Although most 
regionalist parties have generally been supportive of European integration (De Winter and 
Gomez-Reino, 2002; Jolly, 2015), Eurosceptic positions have become more common in the last 
two decades (Elias, 2008). As for the relationship between Euroscepticism and other 
ideological orientations, regionalist parties tend to follow the same pattern as statewide parties: 
radical-right and radical left regionalist parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than mainstream 
regionalist parties (Massetti, 2009). 
Since the process of European integration follows a project devised by supranational elites, it 
is virtually self-evident why Euroscepticism can be easily expressed through a populist 
discourse: national sovereignty, which guarantees the democratic representation of the interests 
and identity of the people-nation, is seen as sacrificed by supranational elites in favor of 
Brussels’ centralizing tendencies against the will of the people (Taggart, 1998; Harmsen, 2010; 
Fabbrini, 2017). 
Given the additional (supranational) level of governance in the EU, European political parties 
–whether regional or statewide— have the opportunity to engage in ‘multi-level populism’ 
(Mazzoleni, 2005). This means that due to tactical or strategic considerations, some populist 
parties can shift the meaning of ‘good people’ and ‘corrupt elites’ depending on specific 
conditions, such as the pattern of competition and the position within government (in office or 
in opposition). 
 
Case-studies of the special issue: emerging patterns 
 
The special issue consists of six empirical articles focusing on the linkages between populism 
and ethno-territorial politics in ten political parties across seven Western European states. Four 
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articles analyze regionalist parties: Massetti’s comparison between Plaid Cymru-The Party of 
Wales (Plaid) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the UK; van Haute, Sinardet and 
Pauwels’ comparison between DeFI and Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium; Mazzoleni and 
Ruzza’s comparison between the Lega dei Ticinesi and Lega (Nord) in Switzerland and Italy; 
and Barrio, Barbera and Rodriguez-Teruel’s study of the Catalan secessionist parties, 
Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya – Partit Democrata Europeo Catala (CDC-PDCAT) 
and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which together with two secessionist 
movements formed, in 2015, the electoral coalition Junts pel Si (JxSi) in the Spanish region. 
Two articles analyze state nationalist parties: Heinisch and Marent’s work on the Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria; and Ivaldi and Dutozia’s study of the Front National (FN) 
in France.   
At first sight, there might seem a full overlap between the territorial organization of parties and 
their ethno-territorial ideology. This because regionalist parties are also regional, in the sense 
that their party organization is present only in a specific territory and they compete in elections 
only in that territory (or ethno-linguistic community in the case of Belgium) within the state; 
while state nationalist parties operate statewide. However, looking more closely, this is not 
exactly the case. On the one hand, the regionalist Northern League (since December 2017 only 
League) has often tried to compete electorally also in regions where the party organization was 
absent and is currently trying to build up a statewide party organization (Mazzoleni and Ruzza, 
in this issue). On the other hand, the state-nationalist FN has clearly adapted its discourse to 
different French regions (Ivaldi and Dutozia, in this issue). In addition, the FPÖ has openly 
engaged in unionist regionalism as its Carinthia’s regional branch adopted a confrontational 
stance vis-a-vis Vienna while at the same time targeting the Slovene ethnic minority in the 
region (Heinisch and Marent, in this issue). The articles show very clearly that these partial 
mismatches between party settlement and ethno-territorial ideology, as well as the taking up of 
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potentially conflicting ethno-territorial ideologies (e.g., state nationalism and regionalism) 
entails both opportunities and vulnerabilities, requiring a sophisticated management of political 
communication across the different levels of government. In addition, engagement with 
multiple ethno-territorial ideologies also leads to top significant ambivalence, particularly as 
to who the ‘good people’ really are and on whom the populist discourse is focused (Mazzoleni 
and Ruzza, in this issue; Heinisch and Marent, in this issue).  
As for the parties’ ideological position along the left-right dimension, seven of them are placed 
right of the center, while three are positioned left of the center. The latter are all regionalist and 
mainstream left parties (Plaid, SNP and ERC). In contrast, amongst the seven rightist parties, 
only two are mainstream right (the regionalist DeFI and CDC-PDCAT), while five are anti-
immigrant radical-right parties: three regionalists (VB, LN and LT) and two state nationalists 
(FPÖ and FN). Interestingly, the five radical-right parties are the only ones adopting a marked 
form of Euroscepticism (van Haute et al., in this issue; Mazzoleni and Ruzza, in this issue; 
Heinisch and Marent, in this issue; Dutozia and Ivaldi, in this issue). Two of them, the state 
nationalist FN and FPÖ, criticize the EU primarily in the interest of their respective nation-
state. One of them, the regionalist VB, attacks the EU primarily in the interest of the Flemish 
region (and the Dutch-speaking community). Finally, two of them, the regionalist Italian 
League and the Swiss League of Ticino, voice their Euroscepticism alternating (and trying to 
reconcile) a defense of regional and national interests.  
From the following articles, it emerges that the parties analyzed and their relationship with 
populism varies considerably. The latter may be considered an essential and stable feature only 
in the five radical-right (and Eurosceptic) parties (VB, LN, LT, FPÖ and FN). By contrast, 
populism is virtually absent in the liberal regionalist DeFI (van Haute et al., in this issue) while 
regionalist parties in Catalonia and in the Celtic peripheries of Britain have adopted a populist 
discourse only temporarily. In particular, Catalan regionalist parties have used populism in 
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their recent shift to a secessionist stance, which emphasized the right of self-determination of 
the Catalan people vis-à-vis Spanish elites (Barrio et al., in this issue); while the SNP and Plaid 
have engaged, since 2010, in a form of left-wing populism that, targeting the pro-austerity 
British elites, resembles Southern European populism in the context of the Euro crisis 
(Massetti, in this issue). 
Summing up, this article intended to conceptualize the relationship between populism and 
ethno-territorial politics in Western Europe. Its aim is the systematic and empirical analysis of 
the linkages between the two key concepts as well as of the different formations and their 
operating logic that engage in both populism and ethno-territorial claims.  While we find a 
conceptual common denominator in equating the ‘the people’ with some concept of ethnos and 
territory and their antagonistic relationship with elites both internal and external to the territory 
in question, the analysis also reveals that the relationship between populism and ethno-
territorial politics is varied and complex. The systematic mapping introduced here is intended 
as a conceptual basis for further empirical research demonstrations of which are provided in 
the following case studies. 
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1 Freeden actually uses the expression ‘thin-centered ideology’ to stress the limited coverage of the core 
component of some ideologies - such as feminism, environmentalism and nationalism - vis-à-vis the main 
ideologies - liberalism, socialism and conservatism (Freeden, 1996; 1998). 
2 It is worth noting that the ethno-demographic conditions of some countries (e.g. Belgium or Bosnia) make it 
extremely difficult to establish which group represents majority nationalism (Zuber and Szocsik, 2018). 
3 In countries where ethno-regional minorities are virtually absent (e.g. Germany or Denmark) or relatively 
scarcely mobilized (e.g. France or the Netherlands), populist radical-right parties are only concerned with 
immigrant communities.    
                                                          
